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The general purpose of the paper is to indicate the
importance of the role of mine warfare in supporting the
nation's defense policy and, ultimately, the nation's
political policy. The basic problem, a lack of attention
and emphasis of mine warfare on the part of persons in
positions of decision in the defense establishment, is
treated in the opening sections as a prelude to describe
the need for such a paper.
Future scenarios for mine warfare employment are de-
veloped to illustrate the importance of the mine and some
of the possible areas where it may be used. This point
is further discussed in relation to the mine's role as a
political weapon as well as that of a strategic and tacti-
cal weapon. This line of thought is expanded through a
discussion of the weapon's value as a deterrent and as a
defensive weapon.
Finally, a design is offered for a future Mine Force
with a much broader range of capabilities and exposure
to Fleet activities. This section includes suggestions
as to the reasons for the design, and beyond that, the
areas that require emphasis to give the mine's capabilities
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In late 1971, Project Mine-9-73 was formed under the
auspices of the Naval Scientific Advisory Program (NSAP)
as requested by the Commander, Mine Warfare Force, "to
examine the mission, tasks, and functions of the Mine
Warfare Force, and to ascertain whether the current ad-
ministrative and task organizations of the Force were
optimum to fulfill the requirements." [Ref. 30]
The approach of the study group was to interview
various members of the mine warfare community to obtain
information as to the current organization and internal
relations of the various Force elements. Members of the
Mine Warfare Force staff (with the exception of the
Commander, Mine VJarfare Force), were interviewed to
ascertain their 'feeling as to the roles and functions of
the Mine Warfare Force. The product of these discussions
led to the dra^i/ing up of a tentative list of ten major
policy issues (Appendix A) . In addition, the anticipated
maximum and minimum extremes for positions on the issues
were included as an aid in accessing future interview
NSAP Project Mine-9-7 3 Study Group: Chairman: Dr. John
W. Odle, of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, Silver Springs,
Maryland. Mr. James Callahan, of the Naval Scientific Re-
search and Development Laboratory, Panamy City, Florida.
Dr. John W. Creighton, Professor of Management, U.S.
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

responses in this area. During subsequent interviews,
the responses to these ten issues were used as a basis
for comparison of the views of the various personnel
interviewed.
Follow-on interviews were held with the following
groups and individuals: the Deputy Commander, Mine V7arfare
Force/Commander, Mine Flotilla Three and his Staff; the
office of the Program Manager, Nineteen (PM 19) of the
Naval Material Command; Op 0325, the mine section of the
office of the Assistant Chief for Surface Operations, on
the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations; Rear Admiral
James A. Dare, USN(ret.)f the first and former Commander,
Mine Warfare Force; and Professor Carl E. Menneken, former-
ly Dean of Research, United States Naval Postgraduate
School, and Chairman of the Mine Advisory Committee for
the National Academy of Sciences.
The interviews were supported by independent study of
documents and reports on the subject of mine warfare. The
major contributing document was the report. Project NIMROD
2[Ref. 15], written by the Mine Advisory Committee (MAC)
under the direction of Professor Menneken. Information was
also derived from a recently completed study report on
2 The Mine Advisory Committee of the National Academy of
Sciences - National Research Council, operating under the
sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research, has its
membership drawn largely from the academic community. The
committee was formed in 19 51 to act in an advisory capacity
with its prim.ary concern with the technological aspects of




prepared by the Mine Ad-
visory Committee. Finally, further information pertain-
ing to the present Mine Warfare Force was obtained through
the study of notices and instructions of the Command.
Although much of the information for the thesis was
obtained during sessions with the NSAP study group, it
is not intended that the thesis be a duplication of the
study group's report. It is rather, a look beyond the
limits of the organization within the Mine Warfare Force
to the larger context of mine warfare as a supporting
element of the nation's defense structure.
B. OBJECTIVES
The basic thesis of this paper is that mine warfare
and the Mine Warfare Force within the United States Navy,
although highly regarded in some circles, suffers from
the lack of exposure to and close attention from the high-
est echelons of the defense establishment. It is, there-
fore, the general purpose of this paper to indicate the
importance of the role of mine warfare in the supporting
of the nation's defense policy and, ultimately, the nation's
international political policy.
The objectives of the thesis are threefold, as follows:
1. To indicate the need to apply some fundamental
concepts of policy management to the problem of developing
goals and policies for the Mine Warfare Force that best
support the defense structure and national defense policy.

2. To act as a catalyst for further discussion and
consideration for the role that mine warfare should play
within the structure of national defense.
3. To introduce the need for some definitive action
on the part of the mine warfare community toward adver-
tising the importance of establishing and maintaining a
mine warfare capability commensurate with present and
future threats.
The arguments supporting these above objectives are
developed throughout the paper, and are outlined here for
the convenience of the reader.
The NIMROD study discusses some of the various peculi-
arities of mines and mine warfare, which make it stand
alone in the defense structure and cause the Mine Warfare
Force to act as a separate element of that structure. As
such, the policies and objectives of the Force must act
in such a way as to support the goals of that structure.
As an aid in developing this point, the concept of a
network, or pyramid of objectives is discussed as a means
of introducing the need to identify the relationship of
the Mine Warfare Force to the overall defense framework.
The advantages and disadvantages of the weapon as
well as an introduction to the various scenarios for its
future employment are developed to assist in understanding
the impact the weapon could have in future international
conflicts. Some of these scenarios have basis in fact.
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while others are products of conjecture on the part of
the writer or of the various persons interviewed.
Upon grasping the idea of the Mine Warfare Force as
a supporting element of the entire defense structure,
the emphasis then shifts to the question of the proper
size and makeup of a Force required to support the goals.
Although not enumerated to the point of identifying
specific numbers of billet assignments and personnel,
the need for the identification of an acceptable minimum
force level is discussed.
Decisions as to the size and design of the Force must
be tempered with the knowledge of the threats and capa-
bilities required to meet these threats, both present and
future. Therefore, some discussion follows as to the
present threats and mine warfare capabilities required to
meet these threats, as well as scenarios to describe future
threats. Finally, one possible design for an effective
Mine Force is presented for consideration and discussion.
C. BACKGROUND
1, Mine Warfare - Historical Development
Mine warfare had its beginnings in the early nine-
teenth century in France, England, and later in the United
States with demonstrations by Robert Fulton and Samuel
Colt. These first demonstrations, although impressive,
did not influence the military to accept the use of mines
in naval warfare. "The first practical and significant

use of mines was by the Confederate States in the Civil
War. The Confederates, correctly advised and finally con-
vinced by Matthew Fontaine Maury that the only defense
of a nation with a vast coast line but without a navy lay
in the use of mines, employed them with a vengeance and
with notable success." [Ref. 15, p. 17]
The development of mines progressed rapidly from
that time throughout the world. Mine warfare became an
effective means of destroying shipping. The mines of the
present are highly developed, powerful weapons with a
variety of detonators and timing devices available for
selection by the user. Thus, the user may design the
weapon to fit each individual situation.
The Hague Convention of 19 7 was convened for the
purpose of inserting some formal restrictions on mine
warfare into international law. The result was a series
of articles (Appendix B) restricting their use under
various circumstances. Perhaps the most important of
these articles was that having to do with the clearance
of mines by those powers that lay the mines.
This tennet of international law has prompted the
side-by-side development of mine clearing capabilities to
balance the mine laying capabilities. The reluctance on




a viable alternative in their "bag of tricks," indicates
a lack of confidence in mine clearing technology at present.
Perhaps one reason for the long overdue use of mines in
North Vietnam could be this same feeling among even the
highest of echelons.
Mine warfare technology can be divided into two
distinct facets of operation. First, pro-mining or mine
laying operations in which a few or many mines with various
detonators are laid in pre-determined patterns and locations
to act as either a defensive barrier from attack or as
an offensive blockade, to enemy shipping. Included as a
part of this facet is the function of mine planning,
under which all contingencies of fields are laid out in
detailed operational orders and stored eiway for possible
future use.
Second, is the function of mine clearing or mine
countermeasures operations, in which either self-sewn or
enemy-sewn mine fields are neutralized to offer safe
passage of shipping. Combined with this are the various
mine hunting (locating) techniques and the methods of
neutralizing the various type of mines.
Finally, the functions of mine maintenance, per-
sonnel training, and research and development of new
3 This concept of the mine as a viable first strike capa-
bility was first mentioned in discussions with Rear
Admiral James A. Dare, USN (ret.) during interviews
with him on 15-16 January 19 73.
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techniques and equipment must all be included as a part of
any total mine warfare effort. Mine maintenance, in turn,
includes the periodic checks that must be accomplished
by specially-trained units. These units are further
charged with the asseiribly of separately stored detonators
and main bodies of the mines in the event of the deploy-
ment of the mines.
2 . Mine V7arfare Force - Present Organization (Appendix C )
The present make-up of the United States Navy's
Mine Warfare Force is headed by the Commander, Mine War-
fare Force who is the successor of the former commanders
of the separate mine staffs for each coast (Mine Pacific,
Mine Atlantic). The recent (1971) unification of the mine
forces was a move toward a more economic and efficient use
of resources.
The Commander, Mine Warfare Force, heads a staff
composed of the normal seven sections of all Naval staffs
(Nl through N7) , and acts as the Type Commander for the
three afloat mine flotillas based throughout the world.
In addition, he acts as the reporting senior for the
separate activities described below:
1. Mobile Mine Countermeasures : (MOMCOM) Basic-
ally, a command and control group for surface and
air mine countermeasures forces. They are charged
with the laying out of sweeping patterns and
monitor the operation from beginning to end. The
helicopter squadron involved in airborne minesweeping
12

operations, although controlled by MOMCOM during
operations, reports the Commander, Naval Air
Forces Atlantic for administrative purposes.
2. Mobile Mine Assembly Group: (MOI^G) This group
is charged with all the maintenance and upkeep of
all the mines held in the various depots and
aboard some ships throughout the world. Re-
sponsibilities include the routine checks and
maintenance done on a rotating basis by the
several detachments of this group.
3. Mine Force Support Group: (MFSG) This unit
provides administrative, logistic and repair
support for units of the Mine Force. It also
maintains certain specialized minesweeping equip-
ment for the Mine Force.
The Commander, Mine Warfare Force reports to the
Chief of Naval Operations through the Pacific and Atlantic
Fleet Commanders, for both operational and administrative
matters. His units are deployed in the areas of concern
of both these Commanders.
Finally, mine desks are located within the staffs
of both the Chief of Naval Operations (OP 0325) and the
Chief of Naval Material (PM 19) for operational coordina-
tion and procurement functions, respectively.
D. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
When the Mine Advisory Committee began working on the
Project NIMPOD study, it became aware of a general theme
13

that seemed to run through the mine warfare community.
This theme is expressed in an opening introduction to
the study's report.
"...many responsible persons in the mine warfare
community were strongly of the opinion that this
area of naval warfare did not receive the attention
or emphasis they considered warranted. In fact,
this was one of the factors which motivated the
study. During the course of the effort this
feeling was not only strengthened, but widened
by the realization that many persons in positions
of decision, even within the Navy, did not under-
stand the characteristics of mine warfare, or its
underlying principles. P'ew fully appreciated
4that m addition to being a highly cost effective
weapon of attrition, the naval mine possesses the
ability to simulate shoaling in any desired de-
gree and time interval in virtually all navigable
waters (i.e., in effect, to convert navigable
water into land) . As a result, the full potential
of the underwater minefield as a military weapon
is not fully and widely appreciated. The con-
sequence is that the use of mines is not exploited
4
The NIMROD study addresses this topic at length, in
Chapter VI of the report [Ref. 1, Pp. 207-241]. It dis-
cusses the present methods of determining the weapon's
cost effectiveness and the various measures of effective-
ness used. Also included are some recommendations for im-
proving the. techniques involved in deriving these measures
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and mining does not fare well in the competition
for facilities, personnel and funds." [Ref. 15, p. 3]
Over four years later, the same theme seems to run
through the conversations and interviews held with members
of the present day mine warfare community. The factors
contributing to this attitude seem to be of the same general
nature, with few exceptions, as those disclosed in the
NIMROD study earlier. Among these are the following
main points:
1. Duty within the mine forces is looked upon by
many officers as non career enhancing. Generally,
surface warfare officers opt for the more glorious,
all-round experiences offered aboard Destroyers.
The only exception to this is the coveted billet
of Commanding Officer of an ocean-going mine
sweeping vessel. This requires early selection
for command as a Lieutenant, and coupled with the
recent severe reduction in mine sweepers, offers
a career . officer an excellent chance for further
advancement in the Navy.
The experience derived in this position how-
ever, is not coveted for its mine warfare aspects,
but for its command-at-sea responsibilities.
Upon completion of his tour as a commanding officer,
this highly-qualified junior officer usually re-
turns to the Destroyer Forces, never to return to
mine warfare duties again. Rarely does this
15

officer continue in mine warfare related billets
ashore or afloat during the remainder of his
career.
2. Mines and mine warfare are not identified with
any specific delivery vehicle. A variety of
vehicles are used that range from Air Force heavy
bombers to nuclear submarines. The military of-
ficer tends to identify his career with a vehicle
rather than a system or area of expertise. For
instance, naval officers refer to themselves as
destroyermen, jet jockeys, or submariners, rather
than as anti-submarine warfare specialists or mine
warfare specialists. The appeal of mine warfare
as a career specialty is therefore rather low on
the list of preferences.
3. Generally, no immediate impact can be seen with
the use of mines as can be seen with the use of
weapons such as torpedoes or bombs, and others
with relatively prompt assessment of the effective-
ness. The effectiveness of a mine field can only
be measured over long periods, and the indirect
effects may never be known. The lack of "bang"
appeal, therefore, contributes to the weapon's
demise as an unpopular, and consequently unsup-
ported weapon.
This continuing theme indicating a general lack of
knowledge and appreciation of the mine as a cost effective
16

weapon implies an obvious inability of the mine v/arfare
community to conduct an as yet effective campaign to change
this attitude. The Mine Force continues to be relegated
to the role of an adjunct to amphibious operations and
anti-submarine planning, with little regard to its value
as a strategic weapon against general shipping operations.
The weapon's recent use in Vietnam, may well herald a new
era in the general acceptance of mine warfare as an im-
portant alternative in various scenarios of war.
Mine Warfare's present position of acclaim is tenuous,
and for some of the same reasons as in tlie past, it may
again slip to a position of disuse. A major campaign is
needed, aimed toward educating the various arms of the
Navy and even the higher echelons within the defense es-
tablishment as to the merits of the mine and the impact
of mine warfare. This campaign would have as an objective
the importance of maintaining an effective mine warfare
capability and would serve to avoid the slippage of
capability that seems destined to occur as the completion
of mine clearing operations in Vietnam draws nearer.
The policy and goals for the Navy's Mine Warfare Force
must be in line with the Navy's overall goals and the
nation's defense policy. If mine warfare can also be
considered a weapon of political importance, then these
goals must also be brought into line with the nation's
political policy. The establishment of a policy toward
the development and maintaining of an effective mine warfare
17

capability must therefore be discussed at the highest levels
of the defense establishment. Finally, an effectiveness
measure needs to be assigned for each of these goals as well
as a method of developing the measure.
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II. FUTURE SCENARIOS OF MINE WARFARE EMPLOYMENT
An understanding of possible future employment of any
warfare capability must be grasped before planning and
the setting of objectives can proceed. The following dis-
cussion of some of the possible future scenarios in v;hich
mine warfare may be expected to take an active part, should
point out both the importance of the weapon and its place
in the defense structure.
A. LIMITED WARFARE
The mining of North Vietnamese harbors and their ap-
proaches by the United States set an important precedent
for future international confrontations. When one con-
siders the fact that U.S. Forces were conducting offensive
operations in a formally undeclared war, various scenarios
come to mind in which this same action might be carried
out by forces other than those of the United States.
The effectiveness of the mine fields in North Vietnam
is not measured in terms of the number of ships sunk or
damaged. Rather, it is measured in terms of the amount of
tonnage deterred from entering the harbors via the normal
sea routes. One measure of effectiveness could be based
on the completeness of the blockade for preventing the




In any event, the fact that shipping was halted points
to an apparent one hundred percent effectiveness for the
fields in North Vietnam. History will undoubtedly record
this mining effort as a major factor contributing to the
eventual signing of the peace agreement in January, 19 73.
Furthermore, this apparent effectiveness of the field,
coupled with the type of conflict it was deployed in, have
resounding consequences in the manner in which mining
operations may be used in future confrontations.
B. INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY
One can envision an announcement by any one of a
number of third-world nations that one of its freighters
has deposited an undisclosed number of mines into a major
harbor as it sailed out of that port. A type of interna-
tional blackmail, possible economic havoc, disruptions of
port activity, to say nothing of the embarassment dealt
upon the nation involved, would be the ensuing result.
This would be further compounded should the nation's naval
forces be unable to respond to the occasion with an ef-
fective mine countermeasures capability.
The retaliating nation would be rash to consider of-
fensive retaliation aimed at the aggressor without first
feeling the pulse of world opinion as to the proper con-
sequences of such a mining action. In light of the pre-
cedent set by the United States in Vietnam, world opinion
might well be one of firm hostility towards any offensive
20

military retaliation. The retaliation might more appropri-
ately take the form of a formal diplomatic measure, rather
than any form of military action.
C. ECONOMIC DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITY
If such mining action could even be considered an
action that might not precipitate aggressive retaliation,
then the mine could be considered a weapon of international
terrorism and political blackmail as well as a weapon of
warfare. This presents the possibility of its use by
almost any belligerent nation that sees some advantage
in blocking strategic shipping routes, harbor areas,
navigable rivers, etc. The blocking of such trade routes
would have tremendous impact on the shipping trade and
could seriously hamper some industries dependent on
shipping. The effect of the closing of the Suez Canal on
the oil industry due to the necessary change in the routes
for shipping crude oil and the additional costs and time
involved in shipping via these routes , serves as a prime
example of this impact.
Mine warfare, by its very existence as a viable, cost
effective weapon, and its relative ease of delivery from
a variety of craft, suggests that a strong pro-mining
capability will be developed by smaller, third-world
nations in the future. This development would greatly
increase the chance that mines will be used in the future
by these less powerful nations to neutralize the power of
21

larger nations such as the United States by inflicting
severe shipping hazards. Their use in these limited con-
flicts could easily affect world trade if the mine fields
were located in heavily traveled areas such as the Straits
of Gibraltar or the approaches to the Panama Canal. These
shipping hazards would not have as much affect on the
Russians however, who are not as dependent on sea routes
nor international trade.
D. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
The necessity for an effective mine countermeasures
capability is clearly evident when one considers that a
requirement to clear mines is apt to occur as a result
of the above actions. Furthermore, the United States Navy
might be called on by the government to clear mines from
various ports in the Middle East that had become blocked
by mines during confrontations between the various bel-
ligerent nations there.
Recently, the requirement to clear mines from East
Pakistani harbors was levied on the Russian Navy after an
agreement by its government that it complete this job.
Had political motives of the United States been served by
it, this task may very well have been assigned to the
United States Navy. The point is then, that the interna-
tional political arena dictates that a strong mine clearance
capability be maintained by the Navy.
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III. DEVELOPING A POLICY FOR MINE WARFARE
A. A NETWORK OF OBJECTIVES
If the goal of the national defense structure is to
effectively support national political policy, then each
of the elements of the defense structure must select goals
that also serve to support this policy. There are no
policy decisions then, that can be considered purely
military in nature, since any military decision affects
political policy. Political, as well as military ramifi-
cations must therefore be considered in the setting of
any defense policies.
Perhaps the best method for illustrating the above
concept, is by a pyramid of objectives and policies. The
pinnacle of the pyramid is the uppermost national defense
goal. The entire pyramid supports the pinnacle of the
pyramid as must all the goals, aims, objectives, and
policies within the national defense structure support the
overall national defense goal.
Just as the pyramid is built in layers, each layer
acting as a support for the one above it until the pin-
nacle is reached, so must each level of objectives be
supported by a lower level of subob jectives which are
supported by sub-subobjectives and so on down to the
lowest level— the foundation. The objectives of any element
23

of the defense structure, therefore must be supported by
subobjectives and sub-subob jectives of that element.
The foundation is formed of immediate, short range
goals of the individual elements of the defense structure.
In the case of the Mine Warfare Force, these short-range
objectives take the form of its Force Improvement Program
(FIP) .
The Mine Warfare Force's Force Improvement Program is
designed to bring forth improvements of the Force from
suggestions from within the Force. These suggestions are
initiated at the assistant chief of staff level, and
submitted to the chief of staff for the Commander, Mine
Warfare Force for consideration, and approval or rejection.
The approved suggestions are then discussed in bi-weekly
sessions of the FIP Advisory Board.
To consider the Mine Warfare Force's Force Improvement
Program as anything other than a short-term objectives
program would be a mistake. The Program serves as a
means of batching many rather short-term projects, con-
cerned with very specific and narrow goals, into one large
program. The control exercised over the projects, and
the interrelationship of the projects, is designed to aid
the transfer of information and methodology among the
various programs.
Since the projects are interrelated and are all of
the same general level of importance and scope, they are
considered to be supportive of one another through a common
24

transfer of knowledge rather than through mutual re-
quirements for support. The FIP projects can therefore
be thought of as being on the same objective level.
It is presumed that one of the major decisions to be
made by the chief of staff and the FIP advisory board in
approving the various suggested projects is that they are
in line with stated overall objectives of the Force. Fol-
lowing the concept of the pyramid of objectives, this would
be, of course, a necessary prerequisite since these lower
level, short-term objectives would be supportive of higher
level objectives within the pyramid structure.
Another aspect to this pyramid illustration is the
range of the objectives at the various levels of the
pyramid. Generally, the higher levels of the pyramid con-
tain the long-range objectives to be supported by the more
specific mid-range objectives of the middle levels. These
are, in turn, supported by the short-range objectives near
the base of the pyramid. The Mine Warfare Force, as an
example, would see its major, long-range objectives near
the top of the structure in support of the long-range ob-
jectives of the defense structure. They are then supported
by mid-range and, finally, short-range objectives of the
Force Improvement Program at the lower levels of the
structure
.
The above, describes one method to be used in the
forming of policies and objectives for an organization.
The two main points to consider in making policy then.
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are the interrelationships among objectives and the fact
that each lower level objective must be in support of some
higher level objective. Keeping these points in mind,
setting the objectives of the organization and deriving
the plans to support these individual objectives, can
then be carried forward.
B. THE PLANNING EFFORT
In considering the best approach to long-range planning
in support of policies and objectives of an organization,
it is necessary to have in mind some basic premises of
corporate planning. George A. Steiner, in his book. Top
Management Planning [Ref. 9] outlines the three under-
lying foundations of any corporate planning effort. These
foundations are of a general enough nature that they can
ultimately be applied to elements within the defense es-
tablishment as v.'ell as in civilian corporations. They are
discussed here to illustrate their possible application
in deriving long-range objectives and long-range planning
for the Mine Warfare Force as an element within the overall
defense structure.
Steiner writes of the three underlying foundations of
any company planning effort: fundamental organizational
socio-economic purposes, values of top managers, and
studies of the environment. These concepts are discussed
in the context of use in commercial business enterprises,




He refers to "those underlying ends which society ex-
pects of its business institutions if they are to survive"
[Ref. 9, p. 32] as the socio-economic purposes of business.
"At the rock bottom this means that society demands that
businesses utilize the resources at their disposal to
satisfy the wants of society." [Ref. 9, p. 32]
In considering socio-economics as an underlying founda-
tion of the military planning effort, thoughts as to the
effect public opinion has had and is likely to have on the
size and structure of the military certainly loom into
mind. The most recent examples of public opinion that have
led to high-level concern and action in our government are:
1. The call for an end to the Draft and the sub-
sequent decision to go to an all volunteer military.
2. A desire by much of the general public, and
stated campaign promises of certain politicians
for a return to isolationism.
3. A public and Congressional demand for a slim-
ming of the Defense budget.
4. The call for the balance of payments, re-
sulting in a cutback in overseas military spending
and bases.
The idea of totally voluntary armed forces can in some
respects, be considered a result of public opinion against
involuntary induction. This, in turn, has meant a slimming
of the various Services both in the reduction of the number
of personnel, in order to insure a manning level commensurate
27

with an all volunteer military, and the slimming of the
portion of the tax dollar spent on defense. Finally, a
general concern for the reduction in the number of troops
stationed overseas and a call for a balance of payments
has prompted a draw down of troops in some overseas areas.
A volunteer military, a slimming of the budget, and a
call for a reduced commitment at overseas bases are all a
part of the socio-economic foundation that must be con-
sidered in any long-range planning effort of the defense
establishment.
Steiner iterates the second underlying foundation of
corporate planning as the values of top managers. By
this he refers to the values, ethics, and philosophies
that high level management adhere to and that ultimately
permeate their thinking in any planning that is done. This
same point can be made for the leaders in the military who
set the policies the defense establishment follows.
Preconceived areas of responsibility and levels of
accomplishment for the various elements of the defense
structure tint the thinking and the planning done for
future contingency operations. That is to say, that past
performance by some military element is the indicator for
future capabilities of that element. Planning for future
contingencies must take these expected capabilities into
account in deciding on the roles to be played by that
element in future conflicts.
28

Although the above is not quite what Steiner had in
mind when he spoke of the values of top managers, it seems
to apply when considering top-level military management.
Steiner 's final underlying foundation of the corporate
planning effort is as follows:
"A cardinal purpose of planning is to dis-
cover future opportunities and make plans
to exploit them. Correspondingly, basic
to long-range planning is the detection of
obstructions that must be removed from the
road ahead. The most effective plans are
those which exploit opportunities and re-
move obstacles on the basis of an objective
understanding of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the company." [Ref. 9, p. 33]
This last statement probably more nearly follows along
the line of military thought than do the preceeding state-
ments on planning fundamentals. The estimate of the threat,
so often stated in military long-range planning doctrines,
is basically the same idea as Steiner 's detection of ob-
structions and obstacles to future plans.
A military estimate of the threat identifies the
strengths and weaknesses of the enemy, that can later be
exploited in an attempt to overcome the enemy obstacle.
The final analysis of corporate planning fundamentals
as applied to the military then points out three underlying
29

points that must be considered in any future military
planning. They are:
1. The socio-economic purposes of the military
in supporting national political policy, and the
effects of public opinion on these purposes.
2. The values of top military managers as applied
to the preconceived notions of the capabilities
of the various elements of the defense structure.
3. The estimate of the strengths and weaknesses
of the threat and its effect on applying military
elements to counter the threat.
Keeping these fundamentals and their application to
military planning in mind, a basic design for an effective
Mine Warfare Force can be discussed.
C. THE POLICY MAKERS
If the illustration of a pyramid of objectives can be
accepted, the decision as to who sets the policy at the
various levels of the defense structure must now be looked
at and considered. In relation to the Mine Warfare Force,
policy direction comes from several sources for the various
aspects of mine warfare (mine planning, pro-mining and
mine countermeasures operations, operational planning,
new systems procurement, and research and development)
.
Some of these aspects, such as planning and operations,
overlap, and the Force therefore receives direction in
some areas from more than one source at a time.
30

Presumably, direction on operational matters, in-
cluding mine planning, filters down from the office of
the Secretary of Defense, via the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(through 0-3, operations, and 0-5, plans sections), and
the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-0 325 in the Surface
Operations Section) , to the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet
Commanders before arriving at the Mine Force level. Each
of these levels may have some input to add as further
direction for the Commander, Mine Warfare Force. Further-
more, the staffs for amphibious, submarine, and anti-
submarine warfare on both coasts generally are consulted
when operational plans for mining overlap their areas of
interest. Finally, the Chief of Naval Material contributes
in the areas of procurement and new systems development
through the office of PM-19
.
Long-range policy planning for the Mine Force is then
done by the Comniander , Mine Warfare Force and his staff
having received direction from several areas and levels of
the defense structure. It is at this level then, that long-
range as well as middle and short-range plans are establi-
shed for the Mine Force. Therefore, either the necessary
knowledge concerning the political, as well as military
impact of the weapon must rest at this level or the plans
for the use of the weapon become of rather limited scope.
One other level in the defense structure might be
considered as the level with some import in the planning
of long-range goals for all areas of the structure.
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including the Mine Force. The plans section of the Joint
Staff is charged with defining plans of the nature and time
frame of the long-range plans being discussed here, and
could be considered as contributors to the long-range
planning for mine warfare done by the Mine Force.
This level of the defense structure seems appropriately
situated to formulate the long-range policies of the Mine
Warfare Force in its context as an element of the entire
defense structure. More importantly, as a member of the
Joint Staff the plans section is in a position to develop
mine warfare plans with a united command point of view.
The argument for active participation by the highest
levels of the defense establishment becomes evident as
one gains a persepective for the v;eapon in relation to
others in the defense arsenals. This is best accomplished
through a discussion of the type of weapon category the
mine must be placed into.
D. THE MINE AS A TYPE OF WEAPON
1. Deterrence Vs. Defense
Weapons tend to become categorized as to their
value as deterrent or defensive weapons. In considering
just where the mine fits in this categorization, it is
first necessary to gain a clear understanding of how the
two categories are defined.
Perhaps the characteristic that best indicates
the contrast between the two types of weapons is the
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relative time of their employment. A deterrent weapon
implies that it is employed prior to a first-strike by
an agressor, to act as a deterrence to that aggression.
A defensive weapon, on the other hand, is actively em-
ployed at the time or shortly after the time of the first-
strike by the aggressor.
The defensive weapon is intended to fend off an
attack by striking at the weapons or personnel employed
in the attack. A deterrent weapon, on the other hand,
is intended to discourage the enemy from making any attack
at all. It stands poised and ready as a very real deter-
rence to an aggressor's force.
The mine has long been considered a defensive
weapon in tjiat it can be used to keep unfriendly ships
from traversing charted mine fields , while friendly
vessels, supplied with accurate charts of the mine field,
pass in and out of the field in safety. This advantage
of mining has been extensively used in the past, and
future planning tends to take this form, at the neglect
of other possible uses for the weapon.
In many respects, the mine can act much as nuclear
weapons in providing a very real deterrence for prospec-
tive aggressors. If the capability to covertly lay a mine
field exists, or if the enemy can be led to believe it




It can safely be concluded then, that the mine
has certain unique characteristics of delivery, timing,
and cost that make it a weapon of both defensive as well
as deterrent value. Any long-range planning of mine war-
fare in the United States Navy, must take this dual value
into account so that this weapon can be used most effectively,
2
. Strategic/Political Value
It should be clear at this point that the mine
is more than just a weapon of tactical significance. Pre-
ceeding statements as to the manner in which it is em-
ployed and the various conditions under which it is em-
ployed indicate that the mine is a weapon of strategic as
well as tactical significance. The capability to employ
or clear mines in all areas and under varying conditions
of conflict ranging' from the overt conflict of a limited
war to the political confrontations such as the kind ex-
perienced during the Cuban missile crises, lend credence
to the mine's value as both a tactical and strategic
weapon.
The political importance of mine warfare becomes
obvious when one considers the role mines could have
played in a confrontation such as the Cuban missile crises.
Short of the actual laying of a mine barrier, the simple
act of hinting at such a capability would most probably
have had the same effect the naval blockade finally had,
but v;ith much less expense and less display of force.
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One can further conjecture at the part the mine
fields and their clearance played in the discussions lead-
ing to the final agreements between the United States and
North Vietnam. Certainly, the mine field played a vital
role in causing the North Vietnamese to begin serious
negotiations toward a settlement. These same mine fields
then undoubtedly were used as effective levers by the
United States in negotiating the actual settlement of
the dispute. In this way then, mine warfare played a
dual role as military weapon and political lever.
The point that is being made is that the mine
could be a weapon of considerable political influence,
and a more flexible utilization of mines to achieve
political objectives needs to be urged. The interesting
suggestion to do just this was advanced in a study done
on strategic bombing and was quoted in the Project NIMROD
report as follows:
"Although no particular incident in the war
brought attention to the fact that the threat
of mines can be a powerful influence in settling
international disputes, there were numerous in-
dications which would lead to that general con-
clusion. ...the possible future use of aerial
mines in settling international disputes should
therefore not be overlooked. Mines can be
dropped so as to produce a blockade effect with-
out actually resulting in direct harm or blood-
shed to the local populace. The economic effects
of such a blockade might well assist settlement
of disputes without combat." [Ref. 15, p. 275]
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IV. DESIGN FOR A FUTURE MINE WARFARE FORCE
A. A BASIC DESIGN
The suggestions offered here are not intended as final
plans or solutions. They are, at best, mere outlines or
concepts of what might later be thoroughly studied and
incorporated in future, long-range planning efforts. This
paper has focused on the need for an effective mine war-
fare capability. The ability to develop and maintain
this capability in the face of mounting pressures toward
slimming the military budget requires a well thought-out
plan. This plan must clearly incorporate cost effective-
ness measures with measures designed toward the establish-
ment of an effective mine warfare capability.
Perhaps the most efficient way to solve the problem
of developing and maintaining an effective Mine VJarfare
Force, while at the same time remaining within fiscal
restraints, would be to develop an expertise in pro-
mining operations within existing units of the various
surface, subsurface, and air arms of the Navy. This would
require the development of equipment and techniques for
use aboard all the various craft envisioned as participating
in pro-mining operations.
Included with the increased dispersion of pro-mining
expertise, would be the dispersion of capabilities of mine
countermeasures and mine hunting. The present structure
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of mine countermeasures of a balance between mine sweeping
surface vessels and the airborne mine countermeasures
technique (AMCM) , could be expanded through the inter-
spersion of various surface units within a task group
equipped to act as control and support ships for an AMCM
helicopter detachment. Furthermore, the forward deployment
of the paraphernalia required to conduct an airborne mine
countermeasures operation including trained crews and
appropriate helicopters would greatly increase the Mine
Force's ability to respond to a requirement in a timely
fashion.
The dispersion of units capable of affecting pro-mining
and mine clearing tasks as well as their other primary
tasks, would serve the cause of furthering the capability
of the Mine Force in numerous ways.
First, the deployment of mine warfare capabilities
within the Fleet, and the resultant training and familiar-
ization that must accompany such a move, should act as an
effective advertisement for the merits of mine warfare.
It is commonly known that sailors of any rank or rate
tend to be the best salesmen for any system they become
intimately involved in.
The second effect would be the expansion of the capa-
bilities of Fleet units to perform integrated operations
with our allied NATO nations, most of whom have long been
active in concentrated mine warfare efforts. Along with
this expanded capability to perform mine warfare operations.
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would go the expanded personnel base of expertise that
would be achieved in this field. A strong base of ex-
perienced personnel would, in turn, allow the Mine Warfare
Force to choose from a larger community of personnel in
the manning of its separate afloat units and shore-based
staffs.
The third advantage of this plan is that it remains a
possible alternative to the expansion of the role and ex-
pertise of mine warfare in the Navy while remaining within
fiscal restraints. The cost of developing and maintaining
an expanded Mine Warfare Force with the capability to
deploy and clear mines exclusive of all other units, would
be very difficult to sell in the present tight money
climate. On the other hand, an expansion of capability
through an integration of techniques and equipment among
existing surface, air, and subsurface forces would be
more reasonably accepted.
The fourth, and probably the most important aspect of
the plan is the improved capability to wage mine warfare
that would be available to the Fleet Commander. Mining
would then become a viable first strike alternative in
the event of an outbreak of hostilities, thereby bottling
up parts of the enemy's units before they are deployed.
A plan such as the above, however, would fall short of
its goal if the pro-mining capabilities were advanced
without follow-on advances in the area of mine counter-
measures. As stated previously, the generally accepted
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tennets of international law require a matching counter-
mining capability. A balanced expansion of expertise in
both areas is required in order to insure that mining re-
maines a viable alternative.
Although this plan calls for an integration of pro-
mining and mine countermeasures activities within the
present fleet forces as opposed to a separate Mine Force
tasked with all mining activities, this is not intended
to suggest that some sort of separate Mine Warfare Force
organization is not needed. Indeed, the very nature of a
separate staff activity tasked primarily with mine warfare
activities lends itself to the current Navy trend of cen-
tralized functions. The several activities that might be
labeled as housekeeping chores such as personnel training,
mine maintenance, and mine planning can best be handled
by some centralized organization devoted to such tasks.
One of the major chores that the Mine VJarfare Force
staff might be tasked with is the initial preparation and
continuing update of mine plans for all maritime areas in
support of Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders. The
expertise required in order to prepare and analyze such
plans would remain within the Staff, and thus, a standard-
ization of mine planning methodology and training could be
controlled by this one centralized mine planning agency.
A centralized staff would also act as an agent to
promote and intensify the liaison between fleet units and
the research laboratories in support of test and evaluation
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of new equipment and techniques. Since there would exist
no mine development group as such, for the test and eval-
uation of equipment, the Mine Warfare Staff would need the
appropriate authority to require submission of reports
from units involved in the evaluation program.
Obviously, the centralizing of mine warfare expertise
would insure the availability of a pool of experienced
personnel who coiild assist fleet units in the training of
personnel, and in the solving of maintenance problems.
They would also provide inputs to the training centers for
changes in methods and techniques, and in updating training
in new equipment.
Finally, this centralized Mine Warfare Force staff
would act as the prime mover in an effort to market mine
warfare. Acting in this capacity, the Staff would promote
mine warfare by developing various scenarios and contingency
plans for the use of mines. More importantly, it would
publicize the effect mine warfare could have on national
defense policy and national political policy.
B. AREAS OF NEEDED CONCENTRATION
If the Mine Warfare Force and its associated mine war-
fare effort can be considered an essential element of the
national security defense structure, then it must receive
the attention and emphasis that it warrants. The Mine
Warfare Force, as advocates of a strong mine warfare capa-
bility, must act as the driving force behind an effort to
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advertise the importance of the need for this capability.
The marketing effort needs to be improved within the Force
as a means of implementing this campaign.
The marketing of mine warfare requires the exposure of
facts and v/ell-thought out scenarios in which the mine may
play a part. The thrust for this effort must come from
the Commander, Mine Warfare Force and be directed outward
toward both higher and lower echelons within the Navy and
the entire defense establishment. Precisely, the direction
of this thrust must be in five directions to reach the
vital areas of the defense structure that are most apt to
affect a change in the status of mine warfare within that
structure.
The three areas within the structure of the Defense
Department that require attention in this marketing effort
are as follows:
1. The various arms of the Navy not generally
involved in mining operations but which are apt
to have increasing requirements in mine warfare
expertise as the mine becomes more effectively
utilized. These areas include the naval air
forces, submarine forces, and surface combatant
forces
.
2. The high-level planners within the organ-
ization of the Defense Department, who are apt
to be making policy decisions that would greatly
affect the Mine Force.
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3. The various other services within the defense
establishment that may become increasingly im-
portant in any design for a united command con-
cept for an effective Mine Force. Included in
this category, must be the Coast Guard and
Merchant Marine Forces who are surely to be
effected by any increase in mine warfare
utilization.
Aside from the aforementioned areas of concentration
within the Defense Department, two other communities must
be considered as important targets of a concerted market-
ing effort. The first of these areas includes the legis-
lators who are most apt to have some influence on the
structure of the Mine Foirce and its future development.
Members of the Armed Services Committees and Appropriations
Committees are, perhaps, the most important members of
this group.
Secondly, officials within the State Department who
might be in the situation of negotiating treaties and
agreements with other nations should have some exposure
to the capabilities and limitations of the Mine Force.
Also, this is perhaps the best area to present a strong
argument for the mine as a weapon of far-reaching political
incluence.
One final point that must be discussed in this section
concerns the relation of the Force to the research and
development efforts within the naval reseai'ch community in
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perfecting new technologies and techniques of mine war-
fare. It is only through a pronounced degree of effort
in the area of research and development that truly im-
portant advances in the field can be made. Research and
development therefore, deserves a high degree of attention
and support from the mine warfare community. Only through
a concerted effort in this area can our mine warfare tech-
nologies keep pace with our prospective enemy technologies.
Perhaps the importance of a strong research and develop-
ment program can best be dramatized by quoting Mr. V7illiam
P. Clements, Jr., the designate for the job of Deputy
Secretary of Defense under Secretary Richardson. Mr.
Clements states that research and development will re-
ceive "our first attention. There is nothing more im-




Two points must be discussed briefly before this work
can be considered complete. Both points are all-encompas-
sing in nature, in that they do not apply exclusively to
any specific area of mine warfare, nor to any one of the
sections previously discussed in this paper. These points
are general in nature, and therefore apply to mine warfare
and this thesis in a general way.
The first point to consider has perhaps been hinted
at throughout the thesis, that is, that mine warfare is
a total system of techniques and experience, any part of
V7hich can not be considered alone as the only effort in
mine warfare. As has been previously stated, a balance
of pro-mining and mine countermeasures capabilities is
necessary and required by international law. This there-
fore requires that any technological strides in the area
of pro-mining, become meaningless unless mine counter-
measures technologies are increased correspondingly. The
same argument can, of course, be made for the reverse of
this last statement. That is, that pro-mining technologies
must keep pace with advances in countermeasures. This is
reasonable when one considers the reality of weaponry and
intelligence efforts in this area. Any advances in mine
countermeasures technologies by any one country soon be-
comes a universal advance by other countries as intelligence
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sources find out the intricacies of the advanced
technology. The abilities in pro-mining, thus, must not
lag far behind these advances in countermeasures , to
prevent the mine from becoming an impotent weapon for
the U.S. Navy
.
Three other facets that are necessarily connected
with mine warfare, and must also be considered as intricate
parts of the total system, are training, logistics and
maintenance. Each of these areas must be carefully planned
and advanced along with the technologies of mine warfare.
New techniques and methods, as well as changes due to new
equipment, must be incorporated in training and mainten-
ance programs, while supply support for new equipment must
be carefully planned in advance so as to coincide with
the equipment's introduction into the Force. In conjunc-
tion with this, the entire field of mine planning must
also keep pace with an ever-changing effort to increase
the capabilities of the Mine Force and, ultimately, mine
warfare
.
A second point to consider that relates to the section
on the marketing effort of the Mine Warfare Force, is that
any marketing effort must necessarily have lots of "moxie"
and drive, but this must be controlled to keep mine warfare
in the proper perspective. In selling the mine and mine
warfare as being cost-effective and easily employed by
various existing craft of all Services, it would be a
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mistake to oversell the mine to the detriment of other
programs and weapon systems.
It must be realized, and perhaps stressed by higher
echelons of the Defense Structure, that neither mine
warfare, not any other weapon system can be considered as
other than a part of a total system of defense. Further-
more, no single portion of that system must be allowed




NSAP Project Mine-9-73 Mine Warfare Force (MWF) Organiza-
tion Policy Issues, Anticipated Extremes for Positions.
1. Time frame of concern for organizational horizon:
MINIMUM: Desire quick action, to have impact within
six months to a year. Focus on near-term
problems and solutions. Delegate worries
about long-term future to succeeding waves
of incumbents who will be assigned under
normal rotation.
MAXIMUM: Take long view and address goals that will
require extended and continuing effort over
period of several years. Establish general
strategy and initiate development of patterns
for future courses of action.
2. Boundaries of operational coverage under Mt«7F cognizance
ocean limits, rivers, protective gear on ships, etc.
MINIMUM: Restrict responsibilities to open water
beyond some fixed depth contour or fixed
distance from shore, both for mining and
countermeasures . No responsibility for






MAXIMUM: Seek responsibility for mining and counter-
measure activity in any locale, so long as
water is the medium. Develop active, parti-
cipative role in providing anti-mine protective
measures for all types of vessels,
of facilities and vehicles (e.g., aircraft):
Retain possession of minesweeping vessels
only. Other vehicles are "borrowed" as
needed,- Use any necessary facilities on
tenant basis. Provide mine servicing
capability as requested, without proprietary
rights in mine stocks.
MAXIMUM: Seek proprietary control of all vehicles
assigned primarily or exclusively to mine
warfare functions, including helicopters,
aircraft, and minelayers, as well as mine-
sweepers. Acquire and operate all necessary
facilities. Negotiate basing rights as needed
worldwide. Retain ownership of all mines.
Degree of influence of R&D and force levels:
MINIMUM: Accept what is given and "make do" as
effectively as possible. Process standard
requests through normal channels.
MAXIMUM: Set up special liaison links with R&D centers,
such as NOL and NCSL. Seek representation on
force level study groups. Lobby actively
in OPNAV circles. Apoint local ad hoc study
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groups and prepare position papers for dis-
semination upward and outward.
Level of PR activity and promotional effort:
MINIMUM: Follow established routines. Seek no special
attention.
MAXIMUM: Mount aggressive campaigns to publicize mine
v/arfare/ aimed at a variety of audiences:
general public, politicians, technical bodies,
DOD. Exploit Vietnam experience. Establish
strong PAO to build new, more glamorous image.
Expansion of mine warfare training and education:
MINUMUM: Accept present course, with routing overview
of curriculum and training practices.
MAXIMUM: Retrieve control of Mine School. Invest in
revitalization of curriculum. Boost student
enrollment. Review OJT activities and
strengthen where possible. Get Naval Academy
and NPS to create new specialty programs in
mine warfare.
Personnel opportunity - career attraction:
MINIMUM: Follow present practice in recruiting and
promoting.
MAXIMUM: Initiate and maintain a vigorous campaign
to build pride and esprit de corps . Increase
pressure for billets and budget. Publicize
opportunities. Create new awards. Inspire
personnel to become salesmen for MWF.
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8. Degree of control of services to LANT and PAC Fleets:
MINIMUM: Maintain present relationships.
MAXIMUM: Expand control over personnel engaged in mine
service functions, particularly in PACFLT.
Centralize all mine planning. Insist on
authority to become model for worldwide Type
Command.
9. Representation in OPNAV and System Commands:
MINIMUM: Accept present mine desks as adequate.
MAXIMUM: Insist on increased representation, in re-
spect to both quantity and quality. Try to
develop allegiance of such representation to
MWF and get more aggressive pursuit of MWF
welfare.
10. Overall posture - aggressive/submissive profile:
MINIMUM: Try to do a good job, but don't make waves.
MAXIMUM: Become a problem child if necessary, but
make plenty of noise and get lots of atten-
tion. Subscribe to the rule that the squeak-
ing wheel gets the grease. Maintain pressure
for more of everything that could help MWF.
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APPENDIX B [Ref. 1, p. 27]
Article from the Hague Convention of 1907, restricting
mine warfare.
The articles listed below represent first formal in-
sertion of mine warfare restrictions into international
law. They were derived during the Hague Convention of
1907.
Art. 1 It is forbidden:
(1) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines,
unless they are so constructed as to be-
come harmless one hour at most after those
who have laid them have lost control over
them;
(2) to lay automatic contact mines which do
not become harmless as soon as they have
broken loose from their moorings;
(3) to use torpedoes which do not become harm-
less after they have missed their mark.
Art. 2 It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines
off the coasts and ports of the enemy, with the
sole object of intercepting commercial navigation
Art. 3 When anchored contact mines are employed, every
possible precaution must be taken for the
security of peaceful navigation.
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The belligerents undertake to provide,
as far as possible, for these mines becoming
harmless after a limited time has elapsed,
and, when the mines cease to be under observa-
tion, to notify the danger zones as military
exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners,
which must also be communicated to the govern-
ments through the diplomatic channel.
Art. 4 Neutral powers which lay automatic contact
mines off their coasts must observe the same
rules and take the same precautions as are
imposed on belligerents.
The neutral power must give notice to
mariners in advance of the places v;here auto-
matic contact mines have been laid. This
notice must be communicated at once to the
governments through the diplomatic channel.
Art. 5 At the close of the war, the contracting pov/ers
undertake to do their utmost to remove the
mines which they have laid, each power re-
moving his own mines.
As regards anchored automatic contact mines
laid by one of the belligerents off the coasts
of the other, their position must be notified
to the other party by the power which laid
them, and each power must proceed with the least




Art. 6 The contracting powers which do not at present
own perfected mines of the description con-
templated in the present convention, and which,
consequently, could not at present carry out
the rules laid down in Articles 2 and 3, under-
take to convert the material of their mines
as soon as possible, so as to bring it into
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